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1 Introduction
The extent to which recent African civil wars have
also been agrarian crises has been underestimated.
Urban “loose molecules” and the lure of mineral
resources have been put forward as reasons for
protracted conflicts.Recent research in Sierra Leone
(Richards et al. 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein
2004; Richards et al. 2004) shows that most
combatants came from rural backgrounds and were
induced to fight by promises of food, jobs and
marriage partners, not diamonds. Many ex-
combatants want to go home (to rural areas), but
are unwilling to do so without major agrarian
reforms. These include strengthening the land and
property rights of women and youth. Through
failing to understand the rural roots of recent African
conflicts donors and policy-makers have risked
rebuilding the causes of war. Attention to agrarian
justice, we argue, is now essential if further violence
is to be avoided.
2 The issue of forced labour
A striking photograph from the 1970s shows
“gentlemen farmers” of the Mabole Valley (in
northern Sierra Leone).The fathers and grandfathers
of the group in the picture had maintained large
slave-managed estates to grow rice to feed the
trading caravans along the Falaba Road (between
Port Loko and Guinea). The photograph showed
the group waving aloft a collection of rusty trade
cutlasses.They had posed in response to a question,
“how had landowners prevented farm slaves from
running away?”
The war in Sierra Leone became infamous for
its atrocities, which included the cutting off of
victims’ hands and feet.After intervention by private
security forces (former SouthAfricanDefence Force
counter-insurgency specialists simultaneously
contracted by the government and international
diamond mining companies) and the consequent
collapse of a promising peace process a destabilised
rebel movement exacted terrible revenge. Too little
is made of the fact that the weapon of atrocity was
an ordinary agricultural implement, the cutlass.
It is hard to talk objectively about the issue of
slavery in Sierra Leone andLiberia.The two countries
were founded as homes for freed slaves, and the
issue embarrasses national elites. This
embarrassment also extends to friends of the two
countries.At ameeting about the Sierra Leone crisis
organised by the British government in the early
1990s the senior civil servant in the chair bluntly
warned speakers ‘not to waste our time this afternoon
by raking over old issues concerning slavery’. The
issue does need to be raised, however, because it
left an institutional legacy, which forms an important
background to recent wars inWest Africa.
Domestic slavery was not finally abolished until
around the end of the third decade of the twentieth
century (1928 in Sierra Leone, 1930 in Liberia).
There are still plenty of Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans who were born into a world of domestic
slavery. It was illegal to acquire new slaves in
provincial Sierra Leone after the enactment of the
Protectorate Ordinance (1896). But colonial
government considered the 1898 uprising of interior
chiefs a response to the threat to free existing slaves.
In 1896 it was estimated that as many as half of all
provincial Sierra Leoneans were slaves.Not wanting
to risk further instability, the British soft-pedalled
abolition. The institution (it was hoped) would die
a natural death.
In Liberia,developments followed a similar path.
The country had been founded as a frontier settler
outpost for free Blacks from the USA. Little initial
thought was given to the issue of relations with
African peoples.The constitution gave government
sovereignty over the interior, but there was no
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effective presence when the British and French
expanded into neighbouring up-country Sierra
Leone and Guinea. The colonial powers gave the
Liberians an ultimatum – occupy the interior or
face British and French claims on Liberian territory.
President Arthur Barclay adopted Indirect Rule (the
British-devised system for licensing interior chiefs
to administer on behalf of the state according to
“custom”). The Liberian frontier force “pacified”
the interior, driving many communities deep into
the forest, and waited for chiefs to negotiate with
the ExecutiveMansion. So long as local rulers then
did Monrovia’s will their control over domestic
slaves remained unchallenged.
Domestic slavery remained important in both
countries. Roads and plantations for export crops
were made by slaves. The British were frank that
the prospect of forced labour helped motivate
candidates for chiefly election.Colonially supervised
local courts in Sierra Leone still assisted slave owners
to recover runaways as late as the 1920s (Grace
1977).Although slaves as a proportion of the rural
population declined sharply in districts close to
Monrovia and Freetown, the figure in some more
remote Sierra Leonean chiefdoms adjacent to Liberia
remained 50 per cent or more in 1927 (Grace 1977).
The League of Nations prodded the British
government of Sierra Leone into abolition by 1
January 1928, and a similar reform was enacted in
Liberia in 1930. In the Mabole Valley the
government introduced a work oxen ploughing
scheme to compensate the cutlass-wielding
“gentleman farmers” – a clear indication the slaves
had no intention to stay. In western Liberia, the
anthropologist Warren d’Azevedo (1969–71)
records that slaves departed in droves, and Gola
owners wept at the thought of the work they would
now have to do.
3 The issue of gender and rural
marriage relations
After abolition control of rural elites over the labour
of the rural underclasses was reasserted through
other institutions legitimated by colonial (or
Monrovia) rule.Marriage arrangements became a
key. Leading men used their wealth to patronise
poorer families, and received a disproportionate
number of young women as wives. Poorer men
could not afford bridewealth.Many of their liaisons
were, perforce, with the wives of polygynous village
chiefs and elders. Local courts in both countries
cracked down on these relationships. An
impoverished youngmanmight find himself heavily
fined, and the fine commuted to labour on the
husband’s farm (a kind of retrospective bride
service), for the offence of “woman damage”. Young
women were married to rich elders whether they
liked it or not.
Gibbs (1965: 215) summarised the class
structure of Kpelle society, in rural north western
Liberia in terms of themarriage system.His account
could be extended to neighbouring groups in both
countries. Three groups are distinguished: “rich
people”, “children of the soil” and “clients”.Wealth
was measured (for a man) not only in terms of
money and goods but also in control over women
and children.Control over marriage exchanges was
the key to the differences between the classes of
men as “wife givers”, “wife keepers” and “wife
borrowers”. The three classes were, Gibbs notes,
the freeborn, the slaves and pawns. The toh nuu
(literally “upstanding”, prominent person) might
allow some of his wives “to become consorts of poor
men of the lower class who become his tii keh nuwai
[workmen or clients] … a ready-made claque …
sure to praise the man’s name”.
In recent discussions of war and its causes in
both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the issue ofmarriage
(including women’s property and the exploitation
of the labour of young men) was regularly raised
by villagers and ex-combatants (cf Richards et al.
2005; Richards et al. 2004). Young wives reported
being locked in abusivemarriages because parents
could not afford to refund bridewealth, and
complained that the family of the husband seized
the assets of the marriage where a widow refused
levirate marriage. More generally, it was reported
that ‘the chiefs take everything intended for women’,
including postwar relief supplies, and that legal
redress was impossible, since the samemale elders
sat in the local courts (only the daughter of a wealthy
family could afford to appeal a “customary” case to
a higher court). Youngmen repeatedly objected to
being fined large amounts because of their inability
to marry legally. Many openly stated a preference
for vagrancy to forced labour exacted in lieu of fines.
Militia forces in both countries exploited this
issue. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in
Sierra Leone – a movement in which 87 per cent
of ex-combatants were abducted,mainly from farms
or rural primary schools – formed a “combat wives
units” to offer marriage partners to youngmen who
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would otherwise have been too poor tomarry.Asked
about inducements to remain within themovement
(Humphreys andWeinstein 2004), 24 per cent of
RUF ex-combatants mentioned being given a
marriage partner.TheRUF also sought to empower
young women by training them to fight. As many
as a quarter of themovement’s ex-combatants were
female, though underrepresented in demobilisation
(nationally, women accounted for only 7 per cent
of ex-combatants with benefits). Some women
fighters were explicit that they had joined amilitia
faction because of gender-based rural poverty,
disadvantage and discrimination (Richards et al.
2003).
4 Testimony
The part played by marriage, labour and gender
disempowerment in fostering conflict are illustrated
in the following comments, typical of the
perceptions of ex-combatants and villagers
concerning the causes of the two wars (cf Richards
et al. 2005; Richards et al. 2003).
I joined the rebel forces to fight inequality in the
country, and because of this issue I also
encouraged my three children to join. (Female
ex-combatant, Margibi County, Liberia, 2004)
Chiefs victimise youths by imposing heavy and
unjust fines … [but] protect their own children
from doing communal work; criminal
summonses make youths run from the village.
(Youth focus group, Kamajei Chiefdom, Sierra
Leone, 2002)
This war was caused by poverty and injustice.
Our (youth) poverty is caused by having no
education, no training, no money and no jobs.
[The chiefs] fine us toomuch for any small thing.
Because we are poor, we cannot pay. So
somebody “buys” our case, and then we have to
work for that person, and for the chief. This
means we cannot work for ourselves, so we get
poorer, so some have to steal to survive and,
when… caught …get fined again. (Youth focus
group, Margibi County, Liberia, 2004)
Elders ... force [us] to marry … as soon as we
harvest our first …palm fruits. If you refuse…
they charge you to court for smiling at a girl …
But the bride service is not reasonable. You will
be required to do … jobs for the bride’s family,
like brushing and making a farm for the family
… sharing the proceeds of your own labour,
harvest or business … You will be forced to give
them 70 per cent [of your drumof palm oil], or
you will lose your wife and be taken to court ...
Most of us … avoid the scene ... [inTongo Field,
a diamond mining area] you can … marry a
woman of your choice.Marriage [in the village]
is the same as slavery. (Male ex-combatant,
eastern Sierra Leone, 2003)
5 Policy implications
International opinions about war in Liberia and
Sierra Leone are heavily affected by the views of
national elites. The “children of chiefs” protected
from “community labour”, arbitrary fining and other
abuses, tend to deny or downplay the role of
agrarian factors. Rural commoners, for their part,
are deeply sceptical about the role of elites. In Sierra
Leone they notice the rapid postwar spread of fine
houses in the hills above Freetown in a country
with no effective economy for the past ten years,
while isolated villages, too far off-road to be visited
by aid delegations, continue to lack even the most
basic facilities (schools, health posts, sanitation).
The contrast re-ignites some of the bitterness that
fed the war.
We argue (cf. Richards et al. 2004; Richards et
al. 2005) that only fundamental agrarian reform
will serve to reduce resentment. Five requirements
stand out:
1. Land reform(to introduce guaranteed shorthold
tenancies to reduce the dependence of mobile
young people on traditional patrons)
2. Marriage reform (to protect women’s property
and reduce vulnerability of young people to
labour exploitation)
3. Reform of local courts (to document custom,
and abolish it where inconsistent with national
law, e.g. on rural women’s inheritance; to
supervise court officials)
4. Reform of basic schooling (to increase
participation of rural girls, enable management
of schools by parents, shift curriculum towards
knowledge and skills important in rural
livelihoods, and offer incentives to trained
teachers to work in remote localities)
5. Reform of rural skills training (to stimulate
application of appropriate agricultural
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technologies and business methods, including
electronic networking of rural post-primary
institutions and teaching of information
technology [IT]).
On this last point, it is interesting to note that
IT was among the preferred options of many ex-
combatants. When RUF ex-combatant computer
trainees were interviewed (Richards et al. 2003)
several mentioned that they thought electronic
connectionmight havemitigated the violence.With
the internet, RUF grievances would have been
harder to ignore, with less chance for resentment
to escalate out of control. One female signals
technician talked about how radio training in the
movement had helped give her a sense of gender
empowerment, now being put to good use in
making a success of her small postwar computer-
based typing service.Young women should certainly
be included in any scheme for rurally oriented IT.
More generally, agrarian technologies should be
chosen or designed with a clear understanding of
the institutional disadvantages faced by
impoverished women and rural youth.For example,
bio-engineered seed technologies with a propensity
to spread from farmer to farmer (e.g. disease-
resistant rice or groundnut types, and hybrid oil
palm seedlings) should be preferred to schemes
requiring heavy involvement of government and
landowning elites (such as subsidised agricultural
credit or tractor cultivation).
But technology will be powerless to create
employment and encourage young rural people to
bind with wider society without institutional reform.
The reluctance of governments and donors to
contemplate such reform is a worrying sign. Social
advisers – based in metropolitan capitals and
lobbied on their brief forays into the countryside
by non-agrarian elites – sometimes seem oblivious
to the urgent need for reform of land tenure, rural
justice and marriage. It is argued that these issues
are “too sensitive” in the immediate aftermath of
war. In Sierra Leone we have been told that to seek
to limit the customary privileges of the rural
landowners would risk re-igniting conflict. This
rates risk of a recurrence of the war of 1898 as higher
than that of the war of 1991.
Liberia sets a somewhat better example.When
Charles Taylor stepped down (August 2003), the
women’s caucus in the Liberian Senate introduced
a law recognising many abuses associated with
custom, as applied tomarriage, labour and women’s
property. TheAct toGovern theDevolution of Estates
and Establish the Rights of Inheritance for Spouses of
Both Statutory and Customary Marriages approved
by the Liberian House of Representatives on 7
October 2003 bans recovery of bridewealth
(“dowry”) by a husband if amarriage fails (s. 2.4),
renders it illegal for parents to ‘compel the daughter
or other female relative to marry aman not of her
choice’ (s. 2.10); forbids a husband to ‘aid, abet, or
create the situation for his customary wife to have
illicit sexual intercourse with another man for the
sole purpose of collecting damages’ (s. 2.7) and
renders it unlawful to ‘compel or demand any female
of legal age, whether or not she is his customary
wife, to “confess” or call the name of her lover ...
in order to collect damages from the said lover ...’
(s. 2.8). The Act addresses some of the concerns
cited above, and has relevance elsewhere in the
region.
Other institutional reforms are also needed if
impoverished young people are to return to rural
communities and contribute to agricultural
development. Clear and enforceable contracts
concerning land and labour are as crucial as an end
to the arbitrary workings of undocumented
“custom”.A British-funded scheme to build chiefs’
houses through “community” labour sent a wrong
signal in Sierra Leone. It was seen by many young
people as “punishment” for challenging elders
during the war. But donors also need to put their
own house in order.Abolition of rich country farm
subsidies combined with emphasis on agrarian
rights and justice within the West African region
might serve the interests of peace more than other
aid initiatives combined.
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Note
* This article expresses the personal views of the authors
and not those of their organisations.
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